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THE MYSTERY OF RULE 71A(k): THE ELUSIVE RIGHT TO
FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTION OVER CONDEMNATON
ACTIONS AUTHORIZED BY STATE STATUTE*
THE jurisdiction of the federal courts in diversity cases extends to con-
demnation suits instituted under a state's power of eminent domain.1 But
eminent domain is a sovereign prerogative, 2 and state legislatures often pre-
clude both state and federal judicial consideration of the necessity of the
taking by requiring a nonreviewable administrative determination of necessity
*Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R. v. Stude, 346 U.S. 574 (1954).
1. E.g., Madisonville Traction Co. v. Saint Bernard Mining Co., 196 U.S. 239 (1905);
Sean v. School Dist., 124 U.S. 197 (1888); Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403 (1878).
See 6 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 27.8[2] (3d ed. 1953).
Jurisdiction attaches under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1952), which provides: "(a) The district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy
exceeds the sum of $3,000 exclusive of interest and costs, and is between: (1) Citizens of
different states .... 
For the specific holding that condemnation cases when before a court are civil actions,
see Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 375 (1875). These cases do not often reach the
federal courts. See ADVISORY COMMITEE ON RuLEs FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, REPORT or
PROPOSED RULE TO GOVERN CONDEMNATION CASES IN THE DISTIICr COURTS OF THE
UNITED STATES 31 (May 1948); Id. at 33 (Supp. Report, March 1951). See also 6
NICHOLS, EMINENT Do.tAI.' § 27.7 (3d ed. 1953). Nevertheless, the procedure to govern
them has beeb established by the Federal Condemnation Rule, FED. R. Civ. P. 71A(k),
promulgated by the Supreme Court on April 30, 1951. The Rule states:
"Condemnation under State's Power of Eminent Domain. The practice as herein
prescribed governs in actions involving the exercise of the power of eminent domain under
the law of a State, provided that if the state law makes provision for the trial of any
issue by jury or for trial of the issue of compensation by jury or commission or both,
that provision shall be followed."
2. See Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403 (1878); Colorado Midland Ry. v. Jones,
29 Fed. 193 (C.C.D. Col. 1886); Mineral Range Ry. v. Detroit & Like Superior Copper
Co., 25 Fed. 515 (C.C.W.D. Mich. 1885). See also 1 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN §§ 1.13,
3.1 (3d ed. 1950).
Eminent domain is best defined as the sovereign power to take property for public use with-
out the owners consent upon making just compensation. See Scott v. Toledo, 36 Fed. 385, 394
(1888). See also 1 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.11 (3d ed. 1950). It is an absolute
right of the government and does not require constitutional recognition. See Boom Co.
v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 406 (1878). See also 1 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.1412]
(3d ed. 1950).
However, there are constitutional restrictions on the exercise of the power. The most
important of these are the requirements that "No person shall ...be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation." Found in the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and established as a restriction on state power by the Fourteenth
Amendment. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. See Scott v. Toledo, 36 Fed. 385, 395 (1888).
Moreover, almost every state Constitution contains a similar restriction. See 1 Nicito.s,
EMINENT DOMAIN § 4.1 (3d ed. 1950).
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to precede institution of a condemnation suit.3 On the other hand, the issue
of compensation is always judicial in nature, and the courts cannot be deprived
of their jurisdiction over it.4 Nevertheless, the legislature may require that
a reviewable administrative appraisal be secured before commencement of
state judicial action.5 It is settled that if this procedure is not required, the
suit may be initiated in a federal district court.0 Where state lav prescribes
a prior administrative assessment of just compensation, 7 however, the proper
time for institution of an original action in a federal district court is uncertain.
In the recent case of Chicago, R.L & P.R.R. v. Studc,8 a Delawvare incorpo-
rated railroad instituted state condemnation proceedings, following the admini-
strative steps prescribed by an Iowa statute.9 The Iowa Commerce Commis-
sion approved the necessity of the taking.10 The railroad then filed a petition
3. E.g., Porter v. Board of Supervisors, 238 Iowa 1399, 28 N.W.2d 841 (1947). See
also 1 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 4.101 (3d ed. 1950).
4. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 327 (1892) ; Railway
Steel Spring Co. v. Chicago & E.I.R.R., 261 Fed. 690 (1919). See also 1 NICHOLS,
EMINENT DomrAN § 4.104 (3d ed. 1950). But see United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513,
519 (1883).
Of course, the issues of whether the constitutional provisions have been complied with
and whether the use for which the property is taken is public are also judicial. See Shoe-
maker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282, 298 (1893); See also 1 Nicuos, EMINENT
DoMAmN § 4.1312] (3d ed. 1950) ; 6 id. § 25.1 (3d ed. 1953).
5. Classification of state condemnation rules is difficult since the procedures vary not
only among states but also within the same state. The three most common methods are:
1) initial appraisal by a commission with the right of appeal de novo before a jury (20
states) ; 2) trial by jury without previous reference to a commission (18 states) ; 3) trial
by a commission appointed by the trial court (10 states). Clark, The Proposed Condenn-
nation Rule, 10 OHIo ST. L.J. 1, 9 (1949). See also 6 NIcHoLs, EMINENT DOMAK:; §
24.11 (3d ed. 1953). In 1931, 269 different procedures for judicial condemnation and 56
administrative methods were reported in use in different cases. Fmsr Rn zm oF JUDICIAL
CouNci. OF M fICHIGAN § 46, pp. 55-56 (1931), cited in ADVISORY COMMIT= o:, RuLES
FOR CIVIL PROCEDUBE, REPORT OF PROPOSED RuLE To GovERN CONDEmxTIO. CASES IN
THE Disnucr CoUnRS OF THE UNITED STATES 18 (May 1948). "These numbers have
not decreased." Ibid.
6. Franzen v. Chicago M1. & St. P. Ry., 278 Fed. 370 (7th Cir. 1921). Research
discloses this diversity case as the only one instituted originally in a federal district
court. However, a number of these cases have been removed to the federal district court.
E.g., Searl v. School Dist., 124 U.S. 197 (1888); Wabash MR. v. Duncan, 170 F.2d 38
(Sth Cir. 1948). See also 6 NICHOLS, EMINENT DoMAI § 27.7 (3d ed. 1953). These cases
could not have been removed unless original jurisdiction %as present. Madiswnville Trac-
tion Co. v. Saint Bernard Mining Co., 196 U.S. 239 (1905). Therefore these removal
cases necessarily involve the decision that the suit could have been originally instituted
in federal court.
7. A plurality of states so require. See note 5 stipra.
8. 346 U.S. 574 (1954).
9. Iowa CODE ANN. § 471.6 (Supp. 1954) gives railways the right to "acquire by
condemnation or otherwise so much real estate as may be necessary for the location,
construction and convenient use of its railway... ." The procedure for condemnation
is established by chapter 472 of the Iowa Code.
10. Chicago, M.I. & P.R.R. v. Stude, 346 U.S. 574, 575 (1954). Permission of the
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with the county sheriff, who appointed six resident freeholders to assess
damages." Although dissatisfied with the assessment, the railroad deposited
it with the sheriff and took possession of the property.'2 The Iowa statute
allows either party to appeal from the sheriff's commission to the state district
court,' 3 which tries the case de novo before a jury.' 4 Here, however, the rail-
road brought a condemnation action in the federal district courtYr This court
granted the landowner's motion to dismiss the complaint,' 6 apparently on the
theory that once a condemnor elects to invoke state condemnation procedures
Iowa Commerce Commission is required before a company can obtain the power to
condemn any property. IOWA CODE ANN. § 471.10 (Supp. 1954).
11. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R. v. Stude, 346 U.S. 574, 575 (1954). These steps were
required by IOwA CODE ANN. §§ 472.3 & 472.4 (Supp. 1954).
12. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R. v. Stude, 346 U.S. 574, 575 (1954). This was permitted
by IOWA CODE ANN. § 472.25 (Supp. 1954). That section also provides that the right to
take possession shall not be affected by an appeal from the assessment by either party. The
sheriff is authorized to hold the money pending an appeal. IowA CODE ANN. § 472.28
(Supp. 1954). The commission assessed damages in favor of Stude in the sum of
$23,888.60. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R. v. Stude, 346 U.S. 574, 576 (1954).
13. IOWA CODE ANN. § 472.18 (Supp. 1954) : "Appeal. Any party interested may,
within thirty days after the assessment is made, appeal therefrom to the district court,
by giving the adverse party, his agent or attorney, and the sheriff, written notice that such
appeal has been taken."
14. E.g., Randell v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 214 Iowa 1, 241 N.W. 685
(1932); Hall v. Wabash Ry., 141 Iowa 250, 119 N.W. 927 (1909); Ball v. Keokuk &
N.W. Ry., 74 Iowa 132, 37 N.W. 110 (1888).
15. On March 6, 1952 the railroad filed notice of appeal with the county sheriff.
Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R. v. Stude, 346 U.S. 574, 576 (1954). On March 7 it filed a com-
plaint in the United States district court. Brief for Petitioner, p. 4, Chicago R.I. &
P.R.R. v. Stude, supra. On March 10 and 11, the railroad served new notices of appeal
on the sheriff and the landowner. Id. at 5. These notices were docketed with the Clerk"
of the Pottawattamie County, Iowa, District Court on March 11. Ibid. On March 12
the railroad filed in the United States district court a petition for removal to that court
of the pending state suits. Id. at 6. The landowner on March 24 filed in the United
States district court motions to dismiss the actions commenced by the complaint and to
remand the removed suits to the state district court.
The United States district court dismissed the railroad's complaint, but allowed its
petition for removal. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R. v. Kay, 107 F. Supp. 895 (S.D. Iowa 1952).
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal but also remanded the removed cases to the
state court. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Eighth Circuit on both grounds.
Chicago R.I. & P.R.R. v. Stude, 346 U.S. 574 (1954).
The Supreme Court held that the railroad was plaintiff in the proceedings and conse-
quently not entitled to removal, since 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (a) (1952) allows only defendants
to remove. Although IowA CODE ANx. § 47221 (Supp. 1954) labels the landowner
plaintiff and the condemnor defendant, and the Iowa Supreme Court has construed the
statute to mean that the condemnor is in fact defendant, Myers v. Chicago & N.W. Ry.,
118 Iowa 312, 91 N.W. 1076 (1902), the United States Supreme Court held that for
removal purposes federal law must determine who is plaintiff and who is defendant. It
then followed the decision in Mason City & F.D.R.R. v. Boynton, 204 U.S. 570 (1907),
in which the condemnor under an identical provision of the Iowa Statute was held to be
plaintiff.
16. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R. v. Kay, 107 F. Supp. 895 (S.D. Iowa 1952).
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he is precluded from commencing an original federal action."7  Both the
Eighth Circuit 18 and the Supreme Court"0 affirmed the dismissal, with dis-
sents in each decision.2 0
The Supreme Court apparently restricted its opinion to the procedural hold-
ing that the railroad had phrased its complaint in termis of an appeal rather
than an original action and that federal district courts have no appellate
jurisdiction.21 The Court seems to have ignored the question of whether the
railroad, having completed the state administrative procedure, could have
maintained an original action in federal district court by filing a proper com-
plaint. Moreover, the Court specifically refrained from deciding whether the
railroad could have commenced a federal action before finishing the state
administrative process, 22 although both parties argued this as one of the major
issues involved.P The landowner contended that to invoke federal jurisdiction
the railroad should have started in federal court at the outset.24 The railroad
claimed that it first had to exhaust its administrative remedies, and that there-
fore the dismissal of its complaint on the theory that it had "elected" the
state procedures would deprive the railroad of its right to a federal adjudica-
tion 2 5 Apparently neither party expected a procedural decision.
The Court's decision is unreasonable if based merely on procedural techni-
cality. If correctly drawn pleadings would have been acceptable, as suggested
by the dissents,.2 the Court should have directed the lower court to permit
amendment of the complaint, 7 as the railroad requested in its petition for
rehearing.28 -Since no decisions exist which delineate the procedures appro-
17. Id. at 905. The same is suggested id. at 902, but here there is also an intimation
to the contrary, suggesting that through some undefined process the railroad might invoke
federal jurisdiction after completing the state administrative proceeding.
18. Chicago, R.I & P.R.R. v. Stude, 204 F.2d 116, modified on rehearing, 204 F2d
954 (8th Cir. 1953).
19. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. v. Stude, 346 U.S. 574 (1954).
20. The dissenters were Chief Judge Gardner in the Eighth Circuit and Justices
Black and Frankfurter in the Supreme Court in separate opinions.
21. Chicago, R.I. & P.RR. v. Stude, 346 U.S. 574, 580, 581 (1954).
22. Id. at 582.
23. See Briefs for Petitioner and Respondent, Chicago, R.L & P.RtR. v. Stude, 346
U.S. 574 (1954).
24. Brief for Respondent, pp. 9-23, Chicago, RI. & P.R.R v. Stude, 346 U.S. 574
(1954).
25. Brief for Petitioner, pp. 15-30, Chicago, R.I. & P.R.Rt v. Stude, 346 U.S. 574
(1954).
26. Chicago, RLI. & P.R.R. v. Stude, 204 F.2d 954, 955 (8th Cir. 1953), aff'd, 34t
U.S. 574, 582, 584 (1954).
27. Or the complaint could have been treated as initiating an original action despite
its defects, as in Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943). This course was suggested
by the dissent of Chief Judge Gardner, Chicago, R.I. & P.RtR. v. Stude, 204 F.2d 954,
956 (8th Cir. 1953).
28. The petition for rehearing was denied without comment. Chicago, RI. & P.R.R.,
347 U.S. 924 (1954).
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priate for invoking federal jurisdiction,29 outright dismissal for a technical
error seems particularly harsh. In any event, the Court should not have
avoided making a substantive decision which would have made clear for the
diversity condemnor his rights in federal court.
There are substantive grounds which might prompt a court to deny a federal
suit to a condemnor who has had a prior state administrative determination,
and it is possible that they influenced the Supreme Court. Since condemna-
tion proceedings are in rem actions,30 acquisition of jurisdiction by one court
29. The only reported case in which original federal jurisdiction was invoked is Fran-
zen v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 278 Fed. 370 (7th Cir. 1921). That case, however, involved
a state statute which provided for the initiation of a condemnation action by filing a
petition in the county court. Under such circumstances the procedure for invoking
federal jurisdiction is clear. See text at note 6 supra. The problems present in the
instant case, see text at notes 24 and 25 supra, were not involved in the Franzen case.
Although the cases of Kaw Valley Drainage District v. Metropolitan Water Co.,
186 Fed. 315, 323 (8th Cir. 1911), and Hartford v. Montague, 94 Fed. 227, 228 (C.C.D.
Conn. 1899), present dictum to the effect that in an original condemnation action federal
jurisdiction may not be obtained until the state administrative proceeding has been
completed, these cases certainly do not settle the issue. And the various opinions in the
instant case show that the question is in doubt. The district court suggested by way of
dictum that the condemnor probably could have started in federal district court both
before and after it had completed its state administrative proceeding. Chicago, R.I. &
P.R.R. v. Kay, 107 F. Supp. 895, 902, 905 (S.D. Iowa 1952). The latter suggestion is
inconsistent with the apparent grounds for its decision. See note 17 supra. In addition
the opinion of the Eighth Circuit implied that federal jurisdiction might have been invoked
before the completion of the administrative process, Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R. v. Stude, 20-1
F.2d 954 (1954), while the dissent stated that jurisdiction existed after such completion.
Although the Supreme Court apparently ignored the problem, see text at notes 22 & 23
sqra, the dissents evidenced the dilemma. Mr. Justice Black stated that the condemnor
was entitled to a federal action after a state administrative decision, Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R.
v. Stude, 346 U.S. 574, 582, 583 (1954). Mr. justice Frankfurter claimed that federal
jurisdiction existed both before and after the state administrative adjudication. Id. at
584, 585.
30. E.g., United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 376 (1946) ; Duckett & Co.
v. United States, 266 U.S. 149 (1924); Treasure Co. v. United States, 169 F.2d 437
(9th Cir. 1948); Minnesota v. United States, 125 F.2d 636 (8th Cir. 1942). See also
1 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN §§ 1.142[1], 4.103[2] (3d ed. 1950). The cases abound
with statements to this effect. The problem, however, is whether the instant case is an
in rem condemnation suit, or merely an in personam ascertainment of damages. The
Supreme Court's opinion indicates that it felt the case was more than a damage
determination. Although it did not appear to be concerned with the in rem problem,
the Court said: "The petitioner here seems to ignore the means by which it obtained
the land and seeks to review only the question of damages. It may not separate the
question of damages and try it apart from the substantive right from which the clain
for damages arose. Nor can it be said that petitioner has fully exercised its power of
eminent domain, leaving nothing to be determined but the question of damages. Petitioner
has possession but not title to the land. The land does not belong to petitioner until the
damages are paid .... Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R. v. Stude, 346 U.S. 574, 581, 582 (1954 ).
This is a clear indication that the instant suit must be in rem despite the fact that the
only issue before the courts was one of damages. The dissents, however, apparently felt
that the suit was not an in rem condemnation proceeding. Id. at 583, 585,
See discussion in 6 NICHOLS, EMIXENT DO-MAIN § 24.1111 (3d ed. 1953).
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may prevent any other court from taking concurrent jurisdiction over the res.3'
The exercise of jurisdiction by a judicially empowered administrative agent
is sufficient to vest exclusive control of the res in the authorizing court.3S
Although the Iowa sheriff's commission does not act under any court mandatena
it may be argued that its control of the res is sufficient to establish the exclusive
jurisdiction of the state district court.34 The Iowa Supreme Court has decided
that the state district court sits in an appellate capacity in reviewing the ap-
31. This is the consequence of holding that an action is in rem. E.g., Wabash R.R.
v. Adelbert College, 208 U.S. 38 (190); Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v. Lake State
R.R., 177 U.S. 51 (1900); and see cases cited note 32 infra. See also discussion in
Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 227 (1922).
But see Franzen v. Chicago, M,. & St. P. Ry., 27S Fed. 370 (7th Cir. 1921), where
it is said that a pending state condemnation suit would not be a bar to federal jurisdiction
since the state court had not taken possession of the res.
See also Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard Mining Co., 196 U.S. 239 (1905),
involving removal of a condemnation case which was pending in a state county court
after a commission's assessment had been completed. The Supreme Court allowed removal
after deciding that original federal jurisdiction would have been present. This case is
cited in The Supreme Court, 1953 Term, 68 HARv. L. Ray. 96, 178 (1954), for the proposition
that original federal jurisdiction may be invoked after exhaustion of state administrative
remedies. However, the Eighth Circuit has stated that the Madisonvilie proceeding was
not simply an administrative action but was a civil suit from the very inception of the
state procedure. Kaw Valley Drainage Dist. v. Metropolitan Water Co., 186 Fed. 315,
322 (8th Cir. 1911). -Moreover, even assuming that the state procedure involved in
Madisonville was simply administrative, the Court is not explicit in its determination of
exactly when original jurisdicton would attach. Finally, the problem in that case was
simply to determine whether the statutory elements of original jurisdiction were present.
The opinion did not necessarily involve the decision that a federal court should not
decline to exercise its jurisdiction because a state court's exclusive in rem jurisdiction
had previously attached. This question was not even discussed by the Court.
32. E.g., United States v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 296 U.S. 463 (19361
(liquidator) ; Palmer v. Texas, 212 U.S. 118 (1909) (receiver); Department of Financial
Institutions v. Mercantile-Commerce B. & T. Co., 92 F.2d 639 (7th Cir. 1937) (state
Department of Financial Institutions).
33. See IowA CoDE ANx. §§ 472.3, 472.4 (Supp. 1954).
34. In Carthage v. Rainey, 168 F2d 841 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 885 (1948),
it was held that the state court's jurisdiction over the res dated from the time of the
sheriff's seizure of the property. For this reason, the federal court would not take jurisdic-
tion even though a civil action was commenced there before one was begun in the state
court. See also Gillis v. Keystone Mut. Cas. Co., 172 F.2d 826 (6th Cir. 1949), which
apparently held that jurisdiction over the res acquired by the state Insurance Department
was sufficient to defeat federal jurisdiction; and see Annot., 11 .AL.R.2d 463 (1950),
where it is stated that the action of state administrative bodies which acquire jurisdiction
of the res by statutory provision but without judicial order will bar later federal court
jurisdiction.
But see Gordon v. Washington, 295 U.S. 30 (1935), which approves a court of appeals
ruling that possession of the res by the state Secretary of Banking will not oust a federal
court of jurisdiction.
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praisal by the sheriff's commission,35 and it thus appears that the commission
is acting as an arm of the court. 0
In addition to the in rem doctrine, there are other obstacles which might
preclude federal jurisdiction after the completion of state administrative
remedies. The courts might literally construe the Iowa statute, which provides
that the sheriff's appraisal becomes final if not appealed to the state court.3 7
Or they might adopt the theory of the federal district court in the instant case.
That court denied jurisdiction apparently because it felt that proper respect for
state-established procedures should prevent a condemnor from instituting an
original suit in federal court once the sheriff's assessment had been made. 8
35. Mazzoli v. Des Moines, 63 N.W.2d 218 (Iowa 1954). Four dissenting justices
maintained that jurisdiction of the Iowa District Court is in no legal sense appellate.
Id. at 220.
The United States Supreme Court, however, has impliedly held that the jurisdiction
of the Iowa District Court is original; for it has allowed the defendant to remove caseq
which have reached the state court. See note 41 infra. Removal would not have been
allowed if the court had regarded the suit in the state court as an appeal. See note 42
infra and note 21 supra. See also BUNN, JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE OF THE COURTS OF
THE UNITED STATES 125 (5th ed. 1949).
For a square holding that for federal jurisdictional purposes the federal courts will
decide what is original and what is appellate, despite state charactarization, see Chicago,
M. & S.P. Ry. v. Drainage Dist., 253 Fed. 491 (S.D. Iowa 1917).
36. Possession of and even title to the property may pass by the commission's actions.
See IowA CoDe ANN. §§ 472.25, 472.35, 472.38, 472.39 (Supp. 1954).
37. IOWA CODE ANN. § 472.17 (Supp. 1954) : "When appraisement final. The appraise-
ment of damages returned by the commissioners shall be final unless appealed from."
See also id. § 472.18, regarding appeals, quoted note 13 supra.
If these sections be strictly construed the federal courts may hold that such an appeal
to the state district court is necessary to prevent the administrative assessment from
becoming binding. The Supreme Court has held in Madisonville Traction Co. v. St.
Bernard Mining Co., 196 U.S. 239 (1905), that in condemnation cases under a state's
power of eminent domain, the federal courts must enforce state law. See also Clinton v.
Mo. P. Ry., 122 U.S. 469 (1886). And if the condemnor has paid the damages to the
sheriff and has taken possession of the property, see note 12 supra, the sheriff will,
after a lapse of thirty days, pay the money to the landowner and pass title to the con-
demnor. See IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 472.35, 472.38, 472.39 (Supp. 1954). Thus the federal
action would be rendered moot. And the condemnor who appeals first to state district
court in order to prevent the administrative determination from becoming binding may
be held to have barred federal jurisdiction on the in rem theory. See notes 31-32 su pra,
and accompanying text. If the condemnor begins his federal court action before appealing
to the state district court, his state appeal may be refused on the same in reni theory.
Although that did not happen in the instant case, the problem was not presented because
the case was immediately removed from the state court.
Of course it is possible that notice to the sheriff of the institution of a federal action
will be interpreted as an appeal and that he will not pass title. It is also possible that
the federal courts will decide that the Iowa statutes' requirement of appeal is met by
instituting a federal suit. However, that this will occur is by no means certain.
38. See note 17 supra. The court felt that the railroad could have invoked federal
jurisdiction at the inception of the proceedings, Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R. v. Kay, 107 F.
Supp. 895, 904, 905 (S.D. Iowa 1952), but dismissed the action because the Iowa adminis-
trative procedure had been commenced by the railroad. However, it allowed the railroad to
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Doctrinal support for this theory might be found by reference to the Iowa rule
that a condemnor who abandons state condemnation proceedings after damages
have been determined is bound by that appraisal in any future attempt to
condemn.39 It could be held that initiation of the federal action constitutes an
abandonment of state proceedings.4 0 Thus, for the condemnor who has had
a state administrative determination, the path to federal court is beset with
legal difficulties and is perilous at best.
The condemnor who wants to secure a federal adjudication without running
these risks should bypass the state administrative process and initiate his action
in federal court. Compelling reasons support his right to an immediate federal
adjudication. The Supreme Court has allowed defendants to remove condem-
nation actions from the state court to the federal district court.41 Since re-
moval jurisdiction would have existed only if original jurisdiction were
present,42 it is apparent that the federal district courts must have original
jurisdiction of the proceedings at some time. Assuming that the requisites
of diversity of citizenship and jurisdictional amount are met,43 the only possible
remove because it felt bound by the federal statute which granted removal only at that
point in the proceedings. Id. at 907.
39. The condemnor may abandon the proceedings at any time and decline to take
title to the propert3 See IowA CODE ANN. § 472.34 (Supp. 1954); Klopp v. Chicago,
M. & S.P.R.R., 142 Iowa 474, 119 NA. 373 (1909) (after jury verdict) ; Hastings v.
Burlington f.R.R, 38 Iowa 316 (1874) (abandonment after 2A years of occupancy
by the condemnor allowed on payment of damages). Once the property is abandoned
the condemnor may not recondemn the same property without being bound by the first
assessment. See Robertson v. Hartenbower, 120 Iowa 410, 94 N.W. 857 (1903) ; Hupert
v. Anderson, 35 Iowa 578 (1872).
40. If the federal court should so hold, the condemnor would be buund by the state
commission's award, since federal courts in diversity cases must apply state substantive
law. See note 37 supra.
41. E.g., Mason City & F.D.R.R. v. Boynton, 204 U.S. 570 (1907) (involving an Iowa
statute identical to the one in the instant case). See also cases cited note 6 sutra.
42. The removal jurisdiction of the federal courts is conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1441
(1952):
"(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action
brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original
jurisdicton, may be removed by the defendant or defendants, to the district court of thV
United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is
pending."
Removal of a diversity case is permitted "only if none of the parties in interest
properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the state in which such action
is brought." Id. § 1441(b). See MooR, COmim-NTAR" ON Ti, U.S. J t1'1AL COE-
f[ 0.03(35) (1949). For a general discussion of removal jurisdiction, see Bu.;., Jitlas-
DIcToN AND PRACTICE OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 126-32 (5th aL 1949).
In allowing removal of a 1905 diversity condemnation case the Supreme Court e,.-
plicitly held that original jurisdiction was present and that hence removal would Ue
allowed. Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard -Mining Co., 196 U.S. 239 (1905 .
And in 1907 the Court allowed removal of a diversity condemnation case arisint, under td.
Iowa statute. Mason City & F.D.R.R. v. Boynton, 204 U.S. 570 (1907).
43. For the requisites of diversity jurisdiction, see note I supra
1955]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
obstacle to federal jurisdiction attaching at the outset is that compliance with
Iowa administrative procedure may be held necessary to the maturing of a
federal cause of action.44 Such a holding would be erroneous. The administra-
tive remedies are merely procedural, and although the Iowa legislature can
prescribe rules to govern actions in its own courts, state procedure does not
govern federal courts.40  Moreover, the administrative commission provided
44. This was the contention of the condemnor in the instant case. Brief for Petitioner,
pp. 15-30, Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R. v. Stude, 346 U.S. 574 (1954). This position was sup-
ported in The Supreme Court, 1953 Tern, 68 HARv. L. REv. 96, 177 (1954). However,
the cases cited to sustain this position by both the brief and the note are all removal cases.
And the considerations involved in the determination of removal jurisdiction are materially
different from those involved in the determination of original jurisdiction. There is no
doubt that cases may not be removed from administrative bodies and that removal
jurisdiction exists only when the proceedings become civil actions before a state court.
See, e.g., Upshur County v. Rich, 135 U.S. 467, 471 (1890) ; Delaware County Comnm'rs
v. Diebold Safe & Lock Co., 133 U.S. 473, 487 (1890) ; Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S.
403 (1878); Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Drainage Dist., 253 Fed. 491, 498 (S.D. Iowa
1917). Cf. Searl v. School Dist., 124 U.S. 197, 199-200 (1888). In condemnation cases
the condemnor initiates the proceedings and elects the forum. If he chooses the state
procedure, the state rules are, of course, applicable. And these rules determine when
condemnation proceedings become civil actions before a state court. This, however,
does not imply that federal courts would be without jurisdiction of an original action
until the state procedures had been complied with. The state procedure would not be
involved at all in an action originally instituted in a federal court. The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure would govern the controversy. The only question involved would be
whether the controversy is a civil action. See note 26 supra. See also notes 45-48 in fra,
and accompanying text. To assume that federal original jurisdiction may not be invoked
at the inception of the proceedings because federal removal jurisdiction may not be invoked
is to assume the very point at issue.
But see Kaw Valley Drainage Dist. v. Metropolitan Water Co., 186 Fed. 315, 323
(8th Cir. 1911) (dictum) ; Hartford v. Montague, 94 Fed. 227, 228 (C.C.D. Conn. 1899)
(same).
45. The procedures to be followed are established by a chapter of the Iowa statute
labeled "Procedure Under Power of Eminent Domain." IowA CODE ANN,. c. 472 (Supp.
1954). The substantive right to condemn property is granted in a different chapter of
the statute. Id. § 471.6. And once this right exists the railroad has a civil cause of action
which may be adjudicated in federal court. See cases cited note 46 in!ra.
There are no reasons to believe that the Iowa procedure was intended to be a
condition precedent to the accrual of a civil action triable in the federal courts. Since
under FED. R. Civ. P. 71A(k), the federal district court must provide a commission
assessment before trial, see note 1 supra, there appear no reasons for any court to
insist on exhaustion of the identical state proceedings.
46. Federal court procedure is established in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rules to govern the situation in the instant case are established in FED. R. Civ. P. 71A(k).
See note 1 supra. Indeed, the very purpose of Rule 71A was to eliminate the necessity
of procedural conformity to state statutes, which was previously required in condemna-
tion cases by the Conformity Statute. Act of August 1, 1898, c. 278, 25 STAT. 357. See
ADVISORY ComiIITTEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDrRE, SUPPLISMENTARY REPORT OF PRO-
POSED RuLE TO GOVERN CONDEMNATION CASES IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRIC'r CoUR',
18-25 (March 1951).
And, of course, state statutes may not deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction over
civil actions. Southern Pac. Co. v. Denton, 146 U.S. 202 (1892) ; Hess v. Reynolds, 113
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by the Iowa statute is an ad hoc body without expertise ;47 its appraisal should
not be considered the type of administrative remedy that must be exhausted
before recourse may be had to the federal courts. 48 However, even should
a federal court reject these arguments and dismiss the condemnor's suit, he
will undoubtedly be able to invoke federal jurisdiction after be completes
the state administrative process. 49 On the other hand, if the condemnor does
not institute a federal action until after the state proceedings, he runs the
risk of a dismissal which would permanently bar him from federal court.
Condemnation cases are likely to provoke local prejudice.50 Diversity juris-
diction enables a party to avoid the effect of such bias on judicial actions.r'
Hence, it is probable that if federal condemnation procedure were clarified,
more diversity condemnors would seek adjudication in the federal district
courts. In defining this procedure, courts should assure the condemnor who
fears local antagonism the right to choose his forum at the inauguration of
the proceedings.
U.S. 73 (18.5). See also 'Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard Mining Co., 196 U.S.
239, 256 (1905) ; Mineral Range R.R. v. Detroit & Lake Superior Copper Co.. 25 Fed.
515 (C.C.W.D. Mich. 1885).
47. The commission consists of six resident freeholders picked for the assessment by
the sheriff. IowA Coax AxN. § 472.4 (Supp. 1954).
Of the states which require commissions, most provide for an ad hoe commission of
three men. See Clark, The Proposed Condemnation Rule, 10 Onzo ST. LJ. 1, 9 (1949).
See also 6 NICHOLS, E.mi.NEr DomnAI § 26.53 (3d ed. 1953).
48. The requirement that administrative remedies must be exhausted before access
to the federal courts will be allowed is commonly applied in equity cases. See Berger.
Exhaustion of Admizfstrative Remedies, 48 YAi_ L.J. 981, 935-86 (1939). Federal c-urts
were loath to enjoin the state legislative process, which was being carried on by the
states' administrative bodies. See Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 211 U.S. 210
(1908). The primary jurisdiction of the state administrative bodies was based on con-
siderations of convenient and orderly procedure and the belief that the decision of state
appointed experts might render resort to the courts unnecessary. Berger, supra at 1005.
None of these considerations seems applicable to the administrative procedure provided
by the Iowa statute. Rule 71A(k) provides for resort to the same type of commission
before a jury trial may be had. See note I supra. See generally DAvis, A-s -mus' ivE
LAw c. 15 (1951).
49. It is hardly conceivable that a court would use the exhaustion of administrative
remedies doctrine to deny a condemnor access to the federal courts before communcenrent
of state proceedings, and then dismiss the same person's suit at the completion of state
procedure on the theory that he had irrevocably elected state remedies. This would
deny to a condemnor the right to a federal trial which is granted to him by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332 (1952) with procedure set out in Rule 71A(k). See note 1 supra.
50. In the instant case, for example, the railroad was building approximately thirty-
four miles of new line in two Iowa counties and abandoning an approximately equal
mileage in the same counties. Evidently much opposition arose from the people served
by the original line. Since the jury in the state court would be composed Uf people
from this area, the railroad desired a federal adjudication. Letter from A. B. Howland,
counsel for the railroad, to the Yale Law Journal, dated March 22, 1954, on file in Yale
Law Library. Although the federal court's appointed commission might be made up "f
local people, the trial jury would probably be selected from a much wider area.
51. See note 49 supra. See also Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard Mimag
Co., 196 U.S. 239, 253-54 (1905).
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